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Operational technology, information technology for industrial control systems, 
has advanced more slowly in security than other kinds of information technology. To aid 
the discovery of indicators of compromise for industrial control systems, this thesis tested 
a specialized honeypot, Conpot.  Conpot is an open-source low-interaction honeypot that 
simulates an industrial control system such as a power plant and collects information on 
cyberattacks. We created parsers to extract its log data for use as indicators of 
compromise. Conpot provided information such as Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, 
transmission control protocol or user datagram protocol (TCP/UDP) ports, and basic 
protocol-specific data. While this was useful for identifying the protocols most frequently 
attacked and the countries of origin of attacks, we recommend using a high-interaction 
honeypot to generate more effective indicators of compromise. 
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According to Knapp and Langill [1], industrial control systems are the main 
control systems to monitor and manipulate the operational technology used for critical 
infrastructures such as electric-power grids, nuclear reactors, and public-transportation 
systems. While information technology has experienced a rapid growth, operational 
technology has not advanced as much. Even up to present day, industrial control systems 
often use legacy devices and using legacy protocols, many proprietary, without much 
security. 
Initially, industrial control systems operated by communicating with only their 
assigned devices without a need to communicate with any other systems outside of their 
“bubble.” Being contained in the bubble gave a false sense of security and physical 
security was considered sufficient. Many vulnerabilities inevitably became present as 
more industrial control systems became TCP/IP-enabled and connected to the Internet, 
while security measures were not sufficiently improved.  
A. MOTIVATION 
A tool to improve information-technology security is to apply “indicators of 
compromise” to detect possible threats. Currently, their use is uncommon for industrial 
control systems and sharing of open-source indicators is limited. Some vendors recognize 
that indicators can be a means of intrusion detection but do not actively market products 
as they do for traditional systems because the demand for them is small. Today, security 
professionals share known indicators of compromise for industrial control systems 
through the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) 
by analyzing malware samples that have been found in industrial control systems. This 
method is limited in that it is performed after compromise. By the time such analysis is 
shared, attackers are well on their way to finding new ways to attack.  
Knapp and Langill [1] report that industrial control systems are tempting targets 
because an attack on a critical infrastructure such as the power grid can have a 
catastrophic effect on the livelihood of individuals and the operation of business and 
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government. Despite the large potential loss, industrial control systems remain vulnerable 
due to a common misconception outlined by Knapp and Langill that security of industrial 
control systems should be treated just like other information security. They also add that 
applying the same information-technology security measures for industrial control 
systems is difficult because they often rely on proprietary software and protocols, legacy 
devices, and outdated operating systems. They state further that much vendor-provided 
software used by industrial control systems may not be as up-to-date as its information-
technology counterpart, and many of their network protocols are known to be insecure. 
Systems face more difficulties with patching and updating regularly since they require in-
depth testing and scheduled maintenance times to apply these updates or patches [2]. 
With time, vendors may no longer provide support for their software or switch to 
different protocols and it would be very costly to replace the obsolete devices. In 
addition, such software may depend on outdated operating systems that still communicate 
in plain text rather than with secure-shell services.  
B. OBJECTIVES 
Taking these premises into consideration, our goal for this research is to explore 
signatures that may be used as indicators of compromise on a simulated industrial control 
system by gathering information that can be used to prevent future attacks using 
honeypots. Honeypots are machines and devices that simulate the attackers’ desired 
targets to collect information on their activities. By testing a honeypot specifically for 
industrial control systems, we can gather data on methods of attack as a whole, how 
different protocols have different attack vectors, and the current trends in malicious 
activity.  
Our research used Conpot [3] to test the effectiveness of extraction of signatures 
for indicators of compromise using honeypots. Conpot is a low-interaction honeypot that 
simulates an industrial control system using a set of templates. We used the default 
template of Conpot to simulate an electric-power plant and collect attackers’ activities on 
several protocols. After the information was collected, we used a number of protocol-
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specific parsers to filter the attacker activity logs to obtain useful indicators of 
compromise.  
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Our thesis is organized as follows: 
 Chapter II discusses the background for honeypots, Conpot, seven 
industrial-control-system protocols that were used for our honeypot, 
indicators of compromise, and previous studies.  
 Chapter III describes the problem we attempted to solve. 
 Chapter IV outlines our experiment design and methodology. 
 Chapter V analyzes collected data and its significance. 
 Chapter VI summarizes our conclusion and introduces possible future 
studies.  
 4 
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II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK  
A. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Knapp and Langill [1] explain that industrial control systems monitor and control 
physical processes in critical infrastructures such as electric-power grids, nuclear 
reactors, and public transportation systems. They further write that industrial control 
systems were isolated from the business network and physical security was the only 
security protection. With the growth in technology and business needs, especially in the 
1990s, operational technology became more integrated with information technology. To 
share data produced by industrial control systems with the business network, removing 
the air gap that once protected industrial control systems from the rest of the Internet has 
become the norm since the focus now is data availability rather than confidentiality or 
integrity.  
In addition to these weaknesses, industrial control systems differ from traditional 
information technology in that many of its devices use vendor-specific protocols to 
communicate. For example, information technology devices across all vendors use the 
standardized HTTP protocol to request for or respond with resources. For industrial 
control systems, depending on the vendor of the device being used, different proprietary 
protocols may be used for the same communication functions. Knapp and Langill 
conclude that the lack of uniformity and transparency complicates the security of 
industrial control systems. 
B. HONEYPOTS 
To shift the focus in information security from being reactive to proactive, 
honeypots are helpful. A honeypot is hardware and/or software that simulates an 
attractive target for attackers as bait to obtain intelligence from attackers [4]. Honeypots 
offer low false-positive rates and minimal resources by only gathering information when 
an interaction is taking place, which by definition is unauthorized. There are three major 
types of honeypots: low-interaction, medium-interaction, and high-interaction [5].  
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Low-interaction honeypots are the simplest form of honeypots and they typically 
respond to simple protocols such as HTTP without any doing actual commands or 
services. They limit the interaction with the attackers and usually simulate the first steps 
of network protocols without allowing the attackers to log in to the actual machines, 
making them safe to use. This thesis will test the low-interaction honeypot tool Conpot. 
Medium-interaction honeypots provide more replies besides the simple handshake of 
protocols, but still, do not provide operating systems services. High-interaction honeypots 
are useful for research because they provide an actual operating system and services that 
allows detailed interaction with the attackers [6]. One example of such an industrial 
control systems honeypot is GridPot [7], a “symbolic cyber-physical honeynet 
framework” that is built on top of Conpot to emulate the protocols used for electric grids 
[8]. High-interaction honeypots are more complicated to install and maintain than low-
interaction honeypots [9]. High-interaction honeypots also require a higher level of 
monitoring since a security compromise may allow control of the operating systems by 
attackers. 
If multiple honeypots are used to create a network, a honeynet is formed [10]. 
Honeynets are more effective in deceiving the attackers since the complexity and 
diversity grow with each additional honeypot. 
C. CONPOT 
Conpot is an open-source low-interaction honeypot that was developed in 2013 
[3]. Conpot acts as a master server for commonly used industrial-control-systems 
network protocols and provides multiple templates that simulate simple forms of them 
[11]. Conpot offers four different templates: 
  “Default template,” which simulates an electric-power plant using 
Siemens SIMATIC S7-200 Programmable Logic Controllers that 
communicate with at least two slaves [12].  
 “Guardian_ast,” which simulates the Guardian AST tank-monitoring 
system typically used in gas stations [13]. 
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 “IPMI,” which simulates a basic system using the Intelligent Platform 
Management Interface (IPMI).  
 “Kamstrup_382,” which simulates a system for the Kamstrup 382 
electricity meter.  
In this research, the default template of Conpot was used with seven protocols described 
as follows. 
1. HTTP 
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is an application-layer protocol that 
allows network HTTP servers (especially Web servers) to respond to the requests made 
by clients. Servers use default port number 80 to listen for incoming connections [14]. 
Clients must first establish a connection with the server using the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) before sending a request. Once the connections are established, clients 
can request pages using HTTP request messages and the server will provide them using 
HTTP response messages.  
HTTP request messages can be GET, POST, HEAD, PUT, and DELETE. The 
GET method retrieves pages from the resources, the POST method sends pages, the 
HEAD method requests HTTP headers, the PUT method uploads pages, and the 
DELETE method gets rid of a particular page. HTTP responses provide status codes and 
header information as well as requested pages. HTTP-response status codes in 200s range 
indicate success, in the 300s range indicate redirection, and in the 400s range indicate 
errors for status codes.  
2. MODBUS over TCP/IP 
MODBUS is an application-layer open-source protocol that has been used for 
industrial control systems since 1979 [15]. MODBUS is a serial protocol used between 
“master” and “slave” devices to transmit information. The master device must start the 
transaction with function codes and inform the slaves of which actions to take. These 
actions are defined by function codes ranging from 1 to 255, with codes from 128 to 255 
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reserved for exception responses. In a standard MODBUS network, one master can 
communicate with up to 247 slave devices with addressing of 1 to 247. 
Eventually, MODBUS could communicate over TCP/IP using port number 502. 
Conpot uses MODBUS over TCP/IP, and it handles four types of messages between 
devices connected over EtherNet TCP/IP networks: request, response, indication, and 
confirmation [16]. The MODBUS manual states that client must first send a request to 
start a transaction and an appropriate response will be sent from the master or server 
device. An indication message is sent by the client to the server and a confirmation 
message is sent by the server to the client. In MODBUS over TCP/IP, traditional request 
and response data is encapsulated with a MODBUS TCP/IP header known as the 
MODBUS Application Data Unit shown in Figure 1. It contains information such as 
transaction identifier, protocol identifier, length, and unit identifier (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 1.  MODBUS request/response messages over TCP/IP. Adapted from [16]. 
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Figure 2.  MODBUS Application Unit header description. Adapted from [16]. 
3. S7Comm 
The S7 Communication Protocol, or S7Comm, is Siemens proprietary protocol 
for Siemens programmable logic controllers that uses the master/slave or client/server 
communication model through port 102 [17]. S7 header fields include information such 
as message type and data length. Data in S7 packets contains function code to 
differentiate between read and write jobs [18]. 
4. SNMP 
The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is a network management 
protocol used to collect data from devices for management, configuration, or monitoring 
[19]. Although the latest version is SNMPv3, Conpot uses SNMPv2 over TCP on port 
number 161. The most common use for SNMP in industrial control systems is to manage 
and monitor a group of field devices from a master system by polling them on a regular 
basis [20].  
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5. BACnet 
The Building Automation and Control Networking protocol (BACnet) is a 
proprietary communication protocol by ASHRAE which provides communications 
among different kinds of devices. According to [21], BACnet is commonly used for 
heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning control systems (HVAC), but also for many 
other industrial control systems. The Conpot default template uses port 47808 for 
BACnet. 
6. IPMIs 
The Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) is a protocol developed by 
Intel, Hewlett Packard, NEC, and Dell to manage hardware in a network through port 623 
[22]. For industrial control systems, IPMI is primarily used to monitor data such as 
temperatures or power status of devices in the network. IPMI can also control devices by 
booting, restarting, or shutting them off. Documentation of device action and data are 
also logged using IPMI.  
7. EtherNet/IP  
The EtherNet Industrial Protocol (EtherNet/IP) was developed in the 1990s by the 
ControlNet International and Open DeviceNet Vendor Association (ODVA). It is built on 
top of Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) [23]. EtherNet/IP has explicit messages and 
implicit messages. Explicit messages are communication between client and server using 
port 44818, while implicit messages are communication between devices using port 
2222. Conpot is limited to explicit messages since its purpose is to interact with attackers 
that initiate communications as clients.  
8. CIP  
CIP is an object-oriented protocol that is encapsulated in EtherNet/IP [18]. CIP 
represents data as objects [24]—an abstract representation of a vendor-specific 
component. CIP supports two types of objects: 1) common objects such as connection 
object, router object, and identity objects, and 2) device-specific objects. Although data 
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differ with the message type, packets always include an encapsulation header, which 
contains the command, length, status, and command-specific data [25].  
D. INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE 
Sanders and Smith [26] define indicators of compromise as attributes that indicate 
the presence of malicious activities. There are two main types, host and network 
indicators. Host-based indicators of compromise are extracted from host machines such 
as file hash, directory path, or file names while network-based indicators of compromise 
are data that can be found in communications over the network such as IPv4 or IPv6 
addresses, URLs, or port numbers. An example is a well-known IPv4 address observed to 
be sending malware to different targets. Such indicators of compromise can be used to 
create a filter rule to prevent connections to the server. Indicators of compromise are 
commercially available or freely distributed by cybersecurity vendors and professionals. 
They are also available in the control-systems compartment of the US-CERT Secure 
Portal, but they are not as extensive as those for traditional systems [27]. Although 
indicators of compromise are effective proactively against attacks, they can only be 
extracted after the incidents have taken place. In this research, only network-based 
indicators of compromise were studied. Using Sanders and Smith’s definition of 
indicators of compromise, we considered IP address, port numbers, the combination of IP 
address and port number, IP address locations, the frequency of communication, and size 
of data being transferred as examples of indicators of compromise. Indicators of 
compromise that may be unique to industrial control systems include protocol data such 
as MODBUS function codes, MODBUS slave identifications (ID), and EtherNet/IP 
command codes.  
E. PREVIOUS WORK ON HONEYPOTS 
Honeypots have been used for various kinds of cybersecurity research. Mokube 
and Adams [9] highlight honeypots as a new form of active defense for following 
reasons: Honeypots create a distraction from valuable assets, provide early warnings of 
an attack, and provide means of study during or after an attack. They outline that 
additional advantages of honeypots are: 
 12 
1. Small dataset: Since honeypot data is only collected during an actual 
interaction, there is no false positive data and noise data is kept to a 
minimum. 
2. Minimal resources: Honeypots do not require a large number of resources 
to implement. 
3. Simple and flexible: Honeypots are relatively simple because they do not 
require new development, and can easily be configured. 
4. New tools and tactics: Data from attacks can be used to discover new tools 
and tactics. 
Mokube and Adams also discuss some disadvantages of honeypots: 
1. Limited vision: Honeypots can collect information only during active 
attacks. For example, malicious activities on the host machine will not be 
recorded unless they involve the honeypot as well.  
2. Identification: Experienced attackers may recognize the honeypot’s 
behavior and identify it as a honeypot.  
3. Takeover: A compromised honeypot may provide a new vector for the 
attacker to take over the entire system.  
Yuksel, Hartog, and Etalle [28] discuss two types of detection mechanisms used 
by intrusion detection systems. Misuse-based detections focus on known attacks, greatly 
reducing false positive rates. However, this type of detection is ineffective against zero-
day attacks. Anomaly-based detections identify anomalies by comparing the system 
behavior to that of a known baseline. This approach may be effective against unknown 
attacks but will produce high false positive rates. Yuksel et al. present a practical 
framework for anomaly-based detection by analyzing the syntactic and semantic 
interpretation of packet messages and protocol fields from real datasets captured from 
different industrial control systems. They conclude that although the framework is fairly 
successful, e.g., for MODBUS-TCP requests, the framework yielded the detection rate of 
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93.7% and no false positive rates. However, they emphasize that their framework heavily 
relies on the quality of the data parser and old data.  
Redwood et al. focused on encouraging zero-day attacks or high-value attacks by 
using high-interaction honeypots such as GridPot and creating a framework that can 
detect anomalies successfully [29]. Due to the sensitivity of the study, details of the 
honeypot implementation were not discussed. However, the authors did mention they 
used a honeynet layer with GridPot, an interaction layer using real human-machine 
interface and emulated cyber-physical systems, an infrastructure modeling layer to 
generate realistic data, and a logging layer to collect and analyze data to alert the security 
professionals trying to defend their electric grid. Redwood et al. conducted multiple 
attacks on their system and concluded that their system was able to successfully 
recognize high-value attacks.  
Piggin and Buffey [30] used a self-developed hardware honeypot configured to 
resemble an actual industrial control system. This study highlights that although software 
honeypots that are commonly used are easier to develop, deploy, and maintain, they are 
limited in that they cannot completely emulate a real industrial control system. Using real 
hardware to emulate a real-life industrial control system closely enables collection of 
detailed data on specific targeted attacks. These include password attacks, dictionary 
attacks, SSH brute force attacks, and attempts to execute malicious code. This study also 
observed heavy reconnaissance scanning which is similar to the study by Serbanescu et 
al. [31]. Their study concluded that although deploying a hardware honeypot on industrial 
control system is difficult and expensive, it allows cybersecurity professionals to better 
study and prepare for rapidly evolving trends in industrial control system attacks. 
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III. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
In an ideal world, cybersecurity professionals for industrial control systems would 
be able to obtain indicators of compromise without financial, time, and manpower 
constraints. Even if they do, developing a hardware honeypot as Piggin and Buffey [30] 
did would allow the improvement of industrial control systems network security. 
However, both of these situations are unrealistic and difficult to achieve. As mentioned 
earlier, indicators of compromise are available commercially but they are mostly limited 
to information technology indicators of compromise rather than operational technology 
indicators of compromise. Even if abundant operational-technology indicators are 
available, most owners of systems will face financial restrictions to keep up with ever-
changing indicators of compromise. Building a separate hardware honeypot platform to 
extract indicators would be difficult and time-consuming.  
To address such problems, our study explored methods for extracting indicators of 
compromise from the attacker traffic information collected by Conpot. Conpot has 
limited manpower and financial requirements since it is an open-source honeypot and is 
fairly simple to install and use.  
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
For our study, we assumed that traffic to our honeypot would be light and its 
existence might require manual exposure via blog postings or classifieds advertisements. 
While some attackers might not recognize that our test system is an industrial-control-
systems honeypot, we assumed that, using common reconnaissance tools, more advanced 
attackers would recognize it and would conduct operational-technology attacks.  
C. SIMILAR WORK 
A 2015 study by Serbanescu et al. [31] focuses on analyzing possible threats in 
industrial control systems using a self-developed and deployed large-scale low-
interaction honeynet. The protocols used in their honeynet include MODBUS, DNP3, 
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ICCP, IEC-104, SNMP, TFTP, and XMPP. They observe that attackers used MODBUS, 
DNP3, and SNMP more often than other protocols on their honeynet. Other observations 
include heavy reconnaissance activities, such as port scanning and a lack of specific 
targeted attacks. These results suggested using high-interaction honeypots to evaluate the 
possible threats in industrial control system.  
Research by Kuman et al. was similar to the experiment conducted by Redwood 
et al. in that a honeynet was used to create an intrusion-detection system [32]. Kuman et 
al. used Conpot and IMUNES, a network emulator, to create a honeynet and host-based 
intrusion-detection system by observing the changes made in Conpot activity logs. The 
study concluded that changes in the log resulting from attacker activity on Conpot were 






Our study used a Dell laptop computer with a Linux 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04.3 LTS 
operating system with 16 GB of RAM and 750 GB hard disk. A virtual machine was 
installed using Oracle VM Virtualbox 5.1.20. Conpot was installed and deployed in this 
virtual machine instead of the actual host machine. The Conpot virtual machine also ran a 
Linux 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04.4 LTS operating system that was configured with 2048 MB of 
RAM and expandable hard disk memory space up to 10 GB of 750 GB. Our experiment 
network was set up outside of Naval Postgraduate School’s firewall to make it easier for 
attackers to discover the honeypot. Both the host and virtual machines use statically 
assigned IPv4 addresses x.x.x.54 and x.x.x.55. Both machines use internal bridged 
networking for communications. Figure 3 shows the experimental network setup.  
 
Figure 3.  Experiment Network Setup  
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Conpot version 0.5.1 was installed in the virtual machine and deployed on a .55 
network using the Conpot-provided default template. The default template is configured 
to simulate an electric-power plant using Siemens SIMATIC S7-200 programmable logic 
controllers along with other industrial control system devices. Seven protocols and their 
port numbers used in the default template are listed in Table 1. All seven protocols were 
configured to use the IP addresses of the Conpot network. Conpot was launched through 
the Linux terminal by executing the command line “sudo conpot --template 
default.” Detailed Conpot installation steps are provided in the appendix, Conpot 
Installation.  
Table 1. Protocols used by Conpot’s default template 








B. DATA COLLECTION 
Our honeypot collected data over four months from October 4, 2017, to February 
15, 2018. Conpot ran during this time period continuously except when its log had to be 
saved and backed up. When that occurred, Conpot was launched again using the default 
template. The network protocol analyzer Wireshark [33] was used to monitor and capture 
network traffic. Table 1 gives the timeline of data collection. 
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Table 2. Data collection timeline 
Date Action 
2017-10-04 ~ 2017–10-04   Tested deployment of Conpot after installation 
2017-10-06 ~ 2017–10-10 
 Brought Conpot online on 2017–10-06.  
 Took Conpot offline on 2017–10-10 to collect conpot.log 
and back up data. 
2017-10-10 ~ 2017–10-16 
 Brought Conpot online on 2017–10-10. 
 Took Conpot offline on 2017–10-16 to collect conpot.log 
and back up data. 
2017-10-16 ~ 2017–10-20 
 Brought Conpot online on 2017–10-16. 
 Took Conpot offline on 2017–10-20 to collect conpot.log 
and back up data. 
2017-10-20 ~ 2017–11-02 
 Brought Conpot online on 2017–10-20. 
 Took Conpot offline on 2017–11-02 to collect conpot.log 
and back up data. 
2017-11-02 ~ 2017–11-16 
 Brought Conpot online on 2017–11-02. 
 Took Conpot offline on 2017–11-16 to collect conpot.log 
and back up data. 
2017-11-16 ~ 2017–11-27 
 Brought Conpot online on 2017–11-16. 
 Noticed increased EtherNet/IP traffic. 
 Started packet capture of Ethernet/IP traffic (port 44818). 
 Took Conpot offline on 11–27-2017 to collect Conpot.log 
and back up data. 
2017-11-27 ~ 2017–12-07 
 Brought Conpot online on 2017–11-27. 
 Continued capturing Ethernet/IP traffic with Wireshark. 
 Noticed increased MODBUS traffic. 
 Started packet capture of MODBUS traffic (port 502). 
 Took Conpot offline on 2017–12-07 to collect conpot.log 
and back up data. 
2017-12-07 ~ 2018–01-08 
 Brought Conpot online on 2017–12-07. 
 Continued packet capture of Ethernet/IP and MODBUS 
traffic. 
 Conpot abruptly stopped logging on 2017–12-13 after a new 
MODBUS connection was established with the following IP 
address and TCP port pair: 172.104.245.71:56042.  
 When Conpot was stopped on 01–08-2018, its logging 
mechanism resumed and a number of activities were logged 
as if they occurred in 01–08-2018. These activities might 
have occurred before this date. 
 Took Conpot offline on 2018–01-08 to collect conpot.log 
and back up data. 
2018-01-08~ 2018–01-11 
 Brought Conpot online on 2018–01-08. 
 Continued packet capture of Ethernet/IP and MODBUS 
traffic. 
 Took Conpot offline on 2018–01-11 to collect conpot.log 
and back up data. 
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Date Action 
2018-01-11 ~ 2018–01-18 
 Brought Conpot online on 2018–01-11. 
 Continued packet capture of Ethernet/IP and MODBUS 
traffic. 
 Conpot log abruptly stopped logging on 2018–01-13 after a 
new MODBUS connection was made with IP/port pair 
172.104.250.171:34954.  
 When Conpot was stopped on 2018–01-18, remaining data 
in cache was dumped and logged into conpot.log as 
activities occurred in 01–13-2018. These activities might 
have occurred before this date. 
 Took Conpot offline on 2018–01-18 to collect conpot.log 
and back up data. 
2018-01-18 ~ 2018–01-24 
 
 Brought Conpot online on 2018–01-18. 
 Continued packet capture of EtherNet/IP and MODBUS. 
 Noticed IPMI traffic increased before Conpot logging was 
abruptly interrupted. Started capturing IPMI packets (port 
623). 
 Captured all processes running initially when Conpot was 
deployed on 2018–01-18. 
 Took Conpot offline on 2018–01-11 to collect conpot.log 
and back up data. 
 VM failed to expand disk space on 2018–01-24 and this 
issue was discovered on 2018–01-29. Due to lack of disk 
space, any activity after 2018–01-24 on conpot.log was lost 
and all packet capture of EtherNet/IP, MODBUS, and IPMI 
after 2018–01-18 was lost.  
2018-02-12 ~ 2018–02-15 
 Freed up 2.7 GB of memory by purging old kernels and 
orphaned packages. 
 Brought Conpot online on 2018–02-12. 
 Took Conpot offline on 2018–02-15 to collect conpot.log 
and back up data. 
 
C. PARSER DESIGN 
To analyze logs specific to each protocol, we wrote the parsers in Python. These 
used regular expression to filter out desired information from conpot.log and displayed the 
remainder. There were six protocol-specific parsers and an overall parser. Data in Conpot’s 
log file (conpot.log) showed that most of the log entries only contained limited flow data 
between two points. Flow data is simply a log format that includes, but not limited to, 
source and destination IP address and port combination. Flow may also include other 
protocol relevant information. In our study, captured flow data included timestamps, IP 
addresses, ports, and other protocol-specific options used between the source and 
 21 
destination. This limited our parser design to concentrate on the extraction of data that we 
can gather from flow data.  
Each parser implemented both general and protocol-specific functions. General 
functions included calculating statistics on protocol activities by date, IP addresses, port 
information, geolocation of IP addresses, and request and response information that may 
provide signatures to create indicators of compromise. All parsers employed the Pandas 
Python package to plot statistical data, Geolite2 Python package to map IP addresses to 
geographical locations, and Pickle package to export data as comma separated value files. 
Since no SNMP activity was present in our data, an SNMP parser was not written.  
Conpot records all HTTP requests received and responses sent out by Conpot. The 
HTTP parser filters out HTTP requests and categorizes them based on the HTTP version, 
access methods, and date of activity. These data are used to determine the distribution of 
the versions and methods used by the attackers, and to calculate the HTTP-request activity 
count and the country activity count, both by date. Finally, a list of countries is organized to 
sum up the activity count of each country. HTTP request messages are ignored due to the 
limitation of our parser. Even though there are much valuable information contained in 
HTTP request messages, our parser was not sophisticated enough to extract and organize 
the contents of HTTP request messages efficiently. 
For MODBUS protocol activity, Conpot logs two different types of flow data: 
connections and traffic. Conpot records connection flow data when an attacker establishes a 
successful TCP connection with Conpot using port 502. It captures traffic flow data when 
an attacker attempts to send a payload over TCP to Conpot using port 502. The connection 
flow data stored in the log file only provide the timestamp, IP address, and port number of 
the source (attacker). The traffic flow data provide the timestamp, source IP address, 
function code, and slave ID used by the attacker. The MODBUS parser filters both 
connection and traffic activities from conpot.log to keep the total MODBUS activity count 
by date and country activity count by date. Then, they are sorted into two different hash 
tables, one to store connection flow data and the other for traffic flow data. Both hash 
tables use the source IP address as the key. The connection hash table only contains the 
source port numbers. The values kept in the traffic hash table are the source port numbers, 
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function codes, and slave IDs. From the traffic hash table, the MODBUS parser uses the 
function codes and slave IDs to produce a distribution of the different types of MODBUS 
requests since those two fields specify which requests are being made.  
Conpot records all EtherNet/IP traffic it generates. The EtherNet/IP parser filters 
out all the requests to extract command code, port, and date information and stores them in 
a hash table using the IP address as the key. The country of origin is also added as a value 
to this hash table. The parser uses the hash table to calculate the distribution of the 
command codes used by the attackers,\ and to gather the request activity count and country 
activity count by date. The parser also sums up the country counts to obtain the total 
country activity distribution.  
For S7Comm protocol activity, Conpot maintains three different types of flow data: 
session, connection, and packet. Conpot keeps track of the session flow by recording the 
source IP address and assigning a unique session ID for that address when an initial TCP 
connection request to Conpot’s port 102 is made.  
When a successful TCP connection for S7Comm messages is established, Conpot 
generates a connection flow data record that lists the source IP address, port number, and 
session ID that was assigned to that source IP. When a source IP address establishes 
multiple connections to Conpot within a short amount of time using multiple source ports, 
Conpot will assign the same session ID to all connections since they all originate from the 
same source IP address that originally made the initial connection request. However, if one 
source IP address makes multiple connection requests over a longer period, new session 
IDs will be generated for each connections requests.  
If a source sends an S7Comm payload to Conpot, a payload flow data record is 
created, which contains information such as session ID, protocol data unit (PDU) type, 
request ID, data length, and request ID. The PDU type indicates what message is contained 
in the packet. For example, PDU type 1 means that the client is sending a “job request” 
message and PDU type 7 means that the client is sending “User data” needed for 
debugging and programming purposes [17]. 
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The S7Comm parser filters out information about the S7Comm connections, 
sessions, and packets, and stores them in three separate lists. All three lists are iterated to 
obtain the activity count and country activity count by date. The total country distribution is 
calculated by summing up the country activity counts of all three flow data. From the list 
containing the session flow data, the IP addresses and the corresponding session IDs are 
extracted and stored in a hash table using the IP address as the key and the session ID and 
country of origin as values. These session IDs are also used as keys to look up session-
specific data in a nested hash table. From the connections list, port numbers, PDU type, 
data length, and requests IDs are extracted and stored in the same hash table by matching 
up the session IDs in the nested hash table. The completed hash table is used to generate an 
overall statistic to determine the trend of the PDU types and data length being used. The 
request IDs are also collected to see if we can identify any patterns from them.  
For BACnet activity, Conpot keeps tracks of four different types of flow data: 
session, connection, PDU, and decoding error. Much like the way it handles the S7Comm 
protocol, Conpot creates a session flow record when an initial connection request is made. 
Once a connection is established, connection flow record is generated. The PDU flow 
record is generated when Conpot receives a BACnet PDU. The PDU type indicates which 
PDU type is being used. Examples of PDU type include “BACnet-confirmed-request” and 
“BACnet-unconfirmed-request” [34]. Decoding error messages are recorded by Conpot 
when an invalid PDU type is sent. Information in the PDU flow record and the decoding 
error messages are not distinguishable to serve as a unique identifier.  
The BACnet parser keeps the information relating to the session, connections, 
PDU, and decoding error flow data in four different lists. Only the sessions, connections 
and PDU lists are iterated to gather the total activity count by date. The decoding error 
message list is not included in the activity count since those error messages are generated 
by Conpot, not by the attacker. Since both the PDU and decoding error flow records do not 
provide any information that can serve as a unique identifier, only the session and 
connections lists were used to generate a hash table that is used to identify the overall 
BACnet activity trends using the IP address as the key. This hash table only has the session 
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ID, which also serves as a key to a nested hash table. The values kept in the nested hash 
table are the port numbers, countries and access dates.  
Conpot’s IPMI data is the most limited out of all protocols. There are four different 
types of flow data: traffic, session, incoming traffic, and closed session. The traffic, session, 
and incoming traffic flow data consist of the timestamp, source IP address, and source port. 
The closed session flow data only provide the timestamp and source IP address. When a 
new connection request is made to Conpot’s port 623, Conpot generates a traffic flow 
record consisting of the timestamp, source IP address and port number. When this 
connection is established, Conpot generates a session flow record that includes the 
timestamp, source IP address and port number. When a connection is successfully 
established, Conpot generates a session flow record immediately after generating the traffic 
flow record. However, when the connection is not fully established, only the traffic flow 
record is generated. When an attacker makes another connection using the same IP address 
and port number combination, Conpot generates an incoming traffic flow record to 
distinguish it as a returning traffic. When a connection from an attacker is terminated, a 
closed session flow data record is generated.  
The IPMI parser keeps track of the IPMI flow data and stores them into a list. The 
parser iterates through the list to extract the date, source IP address, and port number. It 
then checks if the traffic is a returning traffic or if the session is closed. Using these data, 
four different hash tables are formed. One hash table uses the date as the key and stores the 
sum of activity counts as its value. The second hash table uses the date as its key and stores 
the activity count by country as its value. The third hash table uses the country as its key 
and stores the total activity count as its value. The fourth hash table uses the source IP 
address as its key and stores the date, port numbers, whether or not the traffic is a returning 
traffic, and whether or not that session is closed as its value. The last hash table value is 
used for characterizing the overall trend of IPMI data.  
Exported CSV files from all six protocol-specific parsers are used as an input the 
overall parser. Using the data contained in these CSV files, the overall parser generates the 
overall statistics on protocol activities, country count, protocol distribution of individual 
countries, and activity count by date by individual countries. 
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V. DATA AND RESULTS 
From 2017–10-04 to 2018–02-15, Conpot recorded 38,472 log entries (4.5 MB). 
Packet captures of EtherNet/IP and MODBUS traffic were made (totaling 1.3 MB) over 
seven different sessions. This chapter analyzes the data collected for each protocol used 
by the attackers and the obstacles encountered.  
A. PROTOCOL DATA AND RESULTS 
1. HTTP 
Conpot reported a total of 7,366 HTTP requests and responses. HTTP version 1.1 
was the most prominent with a count of 6,214. HTTP version 0.9 had the second highest 
count of 652 and HTTP version 1.0 had 498. There were two HTTP version 0.0 attempts 
from the United Kingdom. Seven different HTTP methods were used along with HTTP 
requests that did not use any methods (shown as “None”) or sent an invalid HTTP 
version 0.9 request. Figure 4 shows the distribution of HTTP methods.  
 
Figure 4.  HTTP request method distribution 
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The observed HTTP activities came from 53 countries, with the top three being 
the United States, China, and Brazil in order. HTTP activity was significant around 
October and November of 2017 and gradually declined from the end of November of 
2017. October 24th of 2017 showed the highest activity of 401 counts with 368 attempts 
originating from the United States and the rest from Nepal, Russia, Italy, Colombia, 
Germany, Brazil, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, and the Republic of Korea (Table 
3).  
Table 3. Country activity count for HTTP on 2017–10-24. 
Country Count 
United States 368 
China 9 
Italy 6 
Republic of Korea 4 
India 4 









There were 2,316 MODBUS activities involving seven countries with the United 
States producing the most activities (Figure 5). Only three of the nineteen function codes 
were used: 0x03 (Read Holding Register), 0x2b (Read Device Identification), and 0x11 
(Report Server ID). Function code 0x2b had the highest count of 49. Only 59 used a valid 
MODBUS function code. From this, we can assume that the attackers were simply 
 27 
making scanning attempts rather than performing specific attacks using MODBUS 
protocol.  
 
Figure 5.  MODBUS-activity country distribution 
Other interesting events were spikes of activity counts on November 13, 
November 23, December 8 of 2017, and January 10 of 2018 (Figure 6). All four dates 
showed that the activities originated from the United States and Seychelles made multiple 
requests using function codes 0x11 and 0x2b originating from multiple ports and slave 
IDs. For example, one attacker from the United States made multiple requests using slave 
IDs from 0 to 255, port numbers from 34617 to 40881, and function codes of 0x11 and 
0x2b on November 13, 2017. On November 16, 2017, ICS-CERT released a security 
advisory [35] that described the vulnerabilities associated with Siemens SICAM 
equipment, and MODBUS is a protocol supported by this product. This date is fairly 
 28 
close to our first and second activity spikes, and the equipment emulated by Conpot is 
also a Siemens product.  
 
Figure 6.  MODBUS traffic over time 
3. EtherNet/IP 
Out of 154 counts of EtherNet/IP activities, only NOP (No Operation), Register 
Session, and List Identity commands were used. Invalid command or null command were 
also observed (Figure 7). Most days only had one attempt except for November 22, 25, 
27 of 2017, when there were 28, 34, 28 activities, respectively. On January 19, 2018, 34 
activities were recorded. The traffic on these dates originated from the United States 
except for November 27, 2017, on which the attacks came from China. 
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Figure 7.  EtherNet/IP command-code distribution 
4. S7Comm 
There were 645 S7Comm activities captured in the log file. Out of 645, 436 
connections were made, 60 sessions were established, and 149 packets were sent. All 
packets were sent with a PDU type of 1 or 7, a data length of 0 or 8, and a request ID of 
0. According to [17], PDU type 1 indicate job request message type and PDU type 7 
indicates user data message type. Japan showed the highest number of S7Comm activity 
followed by the United States (Figure 8). S7Comm activities from Japan occurred almost 
daily throughout the data collection period while attacks using other protocols were rarely 
made from Japan. 
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Figure 8.  S7Comm country distribution 
5. BACnet 
The BACnet log showed 311 activities. Figure 9 shows the distribution of activity 
counts. As explained earlier in our BACnet parser design, Conpot did not provide any 
information that can be used as unique identifiers for PDU and decoding error message 
flow data. From Figure 9, we hypothesize that some data were sent for all 78 established 
connections but all of them used an invalid PDU type, resulting in 78 decoding errors. It 
is only a hypothesis because we have no way of identifying from where the PDU or 
decoding error flow data originated. Activity counts alternated between two and four, 
mostly originating from Switzerland, and the United States. January 8, 2018, particularly 
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stood out with 33 activity counts from Seychelles, Singapore, China, Switzerland, United 
States, and Canada.  
 
Figure 9.  BACnet activity count distribution 
6. IPMI 
As shown in Figure 10, of 262 IPMI activities, 101 sessions were established, 129 
new traffic was present, 30 activities were returning traffic, and only two sessions were 
properly closed. The United States was most active (233 activities) and Seychelles was 
the second most active (15 activities). As noted in our IPMI parser design, Conpot 
provided very limited data for IPMI activities and no other protocol-specific information 
could be extracted.  
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Figure 10.  IPMI activity distribution 
7. Overall Statistics 
As shown in Figure 11, a higher number of overall protocol activities were 
present in the month of October and November of 2017 and the number gradually 
declined over the data collection period. However, Figure 10 shows a few surges of 
activities due to high MODBUS activities discussed earlier. The statistics of all protocols 
(Figure 12) indicate that HTTP, MODBUS, and S7Comm were more popular, with 
50.58%, 31.70%, and 8.83% of the activities respectively. Figure 13 shows that HTTP 
traffic was heavy at the beginning and slowed down over time. The other five protocols 
were more steady except for a few spikes.  
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Figure 11.  Activity count over time of all protocols 
 
 
Figure 12.  Overall protocol distribution 
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Figure 13.  Protocol counts over time 
Our Conpot was attacked by 54 countries, with the average of 10.51 attacks per 
day. Most of the countries focused on attacking the HTTP protocol. Attackers from the 
United States, Iceland, and Seychelles had the highest number of activities on MODBUS 
protocols, while attackers from Japan primarily attacked the S7Comm protocol (Table 4). 
Table 4. Protocol activity distribution for USA, Seychelles, Iceland, and Japan 
Column1 United States Seychelles Iceland Japan 
BACnet 84 10 
  
ENIP 111 3 
  
HTTP 982 42 
 
126 
IPMI 233 15 2 
 
Modbus 1578 680 33 
 





After a high number of MODBUS attacks on December 13, 2017, Conpot 
abruptly stopped responding to any activities and became incapable of logging any 
information. There were also a high number of MODBUS attacks on November 13, 2017. 
When Conpot was stopped on January 8, 2018, it crashed while updating the log file. We 
assume Conpot was flushing the leftover log entries saved in its cache when it halted. 
Due to this event, other information that could have been collected was lost. The same 
failure happened again on January 13, 2018. Since November 13 also experienced a high 
volume of attacks, we hoped to see the same phenomenon happen on February 13, 2018, 
but it did not. 
Due to Conpot’s design that limited data collection to flow data, many protocol-
specific information we wished to extract were absent. To mitigate the lack of 
information, full packet capture using Wireshark was conducted for EtherNet/IP and 
MODBUS protocols by capturing traffic on ports 44818 and 502. The EtherNet/IP 
capture was taken from November 22, 2017, to January 18, 2018, divided up into four 
sessions and MODBUS from November 30, 2017, to January 18, 2018 ,divided up into 
three different sessions. Full packet capture data was stopped after January 18 to make 
space for the Conpot log.  
Most of the MODBUS protocol header information in the MODBUS packet 
capture matched the flow data recorded in the Conpot log file and did not provide any 
additional information. However, one packet captured on December 13, 2018 contained 
the string objectClass0 in the hexadecimal dump of its payload and a function code of 
0x01 (Read coils) as shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15. This contradicts our earlier 
observation of only seeing function codes 0x03, 0x11, and 0x2b in MODBUS activities. 
When conpot.log was manually searched using the IP address, the log failed to show this 
particular activity. Judging from the date, we assumed that this is one of many activities 
missed by Conpot during the mysterious crash occurred on December 13, 2017.  
The EtherNet/IP packet captures also contained protocol header information that 
matched the flow data obtained from our Conpot log file—no additional information was 
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found. However, we noticed that attackers attempted to send non-EtherNet/IP packets 
over the TCP port reserved for EtherNet/IP, i.e., port 44818. Figure 16 and Figure 17 
show an example of a TCP packet containing Microsoft Networks SMB protocol 
information in its payload while Figure 18 and Figure 19 show an HTTP/1.0 Get request. 
Our Conpot log showed that the corresponding packets were sent with “None” as the 
EtherNet/IP command code.  
 
Figure 14.  Frame 5279: Hex dump of suspicious MODBUS packet payload. 
 
 
Figure 15.  Enlarged Hex dump of Figure 13.  
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Figure 16.  Frame 150: Hex dump of a TCP packet sent to port 44818 with Microsoft 
SMB protocol information. 
 
 
Figure 17.  Enlarged Hex dump of Figure 15. 
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Figure 18.  Frame 8: TCP packet (sent to port 44818) payload hex dump showing 
HTTP/1.0 get request 
 
 
Figure 19.  Enlarged Hex dump of Figure 17. 
B. DIFFICULTIES 
The most difficult challenge in our data collection was the limitation on hard disk 
space in our virtual machine. Although it was initially set to 10GB with expandable 
storage space, VirtualBox failed to expand the storage space due to a virtual-machine 
file-format error. This caused the loss of all data between January 24, 2018 and February 
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12, 2018. When we noticed the heavy volume of MODBUS traffic on the 13th of every 
month, a process dump of the virtual machine was performed before taking Conpot 
online on January 18, 2018. We intended to capture another process dump of the virtual 
machine after February 13, 2018, to find suspicious processes, but the virtual machine ran 
out of disk space and taking a process dump was not possible. After we managed to free 
up some space in our virtual machine and Conpot was taken online again on February 12, 
2018, and a process dump was not captured to conserve the disk space for conpot.log. 
Conpot did not crash or experience high MODBUS traffic afterward.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of this research was to test if Conpot is a good method to extract data of 
malicious activity. Our study collected data using seven industrial-control-system 
protocols using Conpot. As shown in Figure 10, HTTP protocol generated the most 
traffic in Conpot rather than other protocols used by industrial control systems. From this, 
we conclude that attackers are concentrating on targeting the protocol with which they 
are most familiar. Data analysis also showed that MODBUS traffic was concentrated 
only on specific dates by a few different source IP addresses using multiple ports to make 
repeated requests. Also, a significant number of malformed packets were present. From 
these observations, we assume that the main motive of our attackers was to perform 
footprinting to collect information rather than exploiting the vulnerabilities of industrial-
control-system protocols. Examination of Wireshark captures of EtherNet/IP and 
MODBUS activities showed that Conpot was not very successful in distinguishing 
between real protocol activities and embedded protocol requests sent to the ports on 
which Conpot listened. Since Conpot only logs basic protocol flow data, embedded 
payloads go unnoticed unless a full packet inspection is performed. Since Conpot can 
emulate various types of industrial control systems, we conclude that Conpot may 
provide a quick way to extract signatures for indicators of compromise even if they may 
not be perfect.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
To further confirm the practicality of Conpot, different templates can be launched 
to collect more data. A good way to generate more traffic to Conpot includes posting on 
websites related to the industrial control systems to advertise IP addresses hosting 
Conpot. Running several Conpot installations simultaneously may also be effective in 
leading the attackers to believe that they have discovered a large network of industrial 
control systems with multiple master servers.  
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To define a better method to extract signatures of malicious activities on industrial 
control systems, we suggest using a high-interaction honeypot. A high-interaction 
honeypot such as GridPot could provide more detailed information about cyberattacks 
beyond what Conpot provides. GridPot provides more steps of interactions, which will 
encourage the attackers to believe they have discovered a real industrial control system 
rather than a honeypot. Complex interactions will allow the researcher to gather more 
behavioral information from the attackers. From this, the researchers may be able to 
extract more precise signatures. 
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APPENDIX. CONPOT INSTALLATION 
This appendix summarizes the steps required to install Conpot version 0.5.1. 
1. Installing dependencies
$ sudo apt-get install libsmi2ldbl snmp-mibs-downloader python-
dev libevent-dev  libxslt1-dev libxml2-dev 
$ sudo apt-get install libmysqlclient-dev 
$ sudo apt-get install python-pip 
$ sudo pip install --upgrade pip 
$ sudo pip install bacpypes==0.13.8 
$ sudo pip install -U pysnmp==4.3.9 
2. Pulling Conpot from GitHub
$ sudo git clone https://github.com/mushorg/conpot.git 
3. Installing Conpot
$ cd Conpot 
$ sudo python setup.py install 
4. Running Conpot with the default template
$ sudo conpot --template default 
Following is a sample console output if Conpot is successfully started.
_ 
 ___ ___ ___ ___ ___| |_ 
 | _| . | | . | . | _| 
 |___|___|_|_| _|___|_| 
 |_| 
 Version 0.5.1 
 MushMush Foundation 
2018-03-05 14:10:00,530 Starting Conpot using template: /usr/local/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/
conpot/templates/default 
2018-03-05 14:10:00,530 Starting Conpot using configuration found in: /usr/local/lib/python2.7/
dist-packages/conpot/conpot.cfg 
 44 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 45 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
[1] E. Knapp and J. Langill, Industrial Network Security. 2nd ed. Waltham, MA, 
USA: Syngress, 2015. [Online]. Safari Books Online. 
[2] T. Macaulay and B. Singer, Cybersecurity for Industrial Control Systems. Boca 
Raton, FL, USA: CRC Press, 2012. [Online]. Safari Books Online.  
[3] “About,” CONPOT ICS/SCADA Honeypot. Accessed December 11, 2017. 
[Online]. Available: http://conpot.org/ 
[4] R. Joshi and A. Sardana, “Honeypots” in Honeypots: A New Paradigm to 
Information Security. Boca Raton, FL, USA: CRC Press, 2011, pp. 1–37.  
[5] M. Nawrocki, M, Wahlisch, T. Schmidt, C. Keil, and J. Schonfelder, “A Survey 
on Honeypot Software and Data Analysis,” Cornell University Library. 2016. 
[Online]. Available: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.06249 
[6] N. Rowe and J. Rrushi, “Software engineering of deceptive software and systems” 
in Introduction to Cyberdeception. Cham, ZG, Switzerland: Springer International 
Publishing, 2016, pp. 220–244. 
[7]  GridPot: Symbolic Cyber-Physical Honeynet Framework. Accessed January 15, 
2018. [Online]. Available: http://gridpot.org/ 
[8]  C. Hurd and M. McCarty, “A Survey of Security Tools for the Industrial Control 
System Environment,” Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho Falls, Idaho, USA, 
2017. [Online]. Available: https://www.osti.gov/scitech/servlets/purl/1376870  
[9]  I. Mokube and M. Adams, “Honeypots: Concepts, Approaches, and Challenges,” 
in Proceedings of the 45th Annual Southeast Regional Conference, 2007, pp. 
321–326. 
[10] A. Dominguez, “The State of Honeypots: Understanding the Use of Honey 
Technologies Today,” SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room, 2017. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/detection/state-
honeypots-understanding-honey-technologies-today-38165 
[11] “Introducing Conpot,” The Honeynet Project. Accessed December 12, 2017. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.honeynet.org/node/1047 
[12] “Conpot,” ICS/SCADA honeypot. Accessed October 04, 2017. [Online]. 
Available: https://github.com/mushorg/conpot 
 46 
[13] K. Wilhoit, “Is Anonymous Attacking Internet Exposed Gas Pump Monitoring 
Systems in the US?,” TrendLabs Security Intelligence Blog. February 10, 2015. 
[Online]. Available: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/is-
anonymous-attacking-Internet-exposed-gas-pump-monitoring-systems-in-the-us/ 
[14] J. Kurose and K. Ross, Computer Networking: A Top-Down Approach. 6th ed. 
Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA: Pearson, 2013.  
[15] MODBUS Application Protocol Specification V1.1b3, Modbus, Hopkinton, MA, 
USA. 2012. [Online]. Available: http://modbus.org/docs/Modbus_Application_
Protocol_V1_1b3.pdf 
[16] MODBUS Messaging on TCP/IP Implementation Guide V1.0b, Modbus, 
Hopkinton, MA, USA. 2006. [Online]. Available: http://modbus.org/docs/
Modbus_Messaging_Implementation_Guide_V1_0b.pdf 
[17] G. Miru, “The Siemens S7 Communication—Part 1 General Structure,” GyM’s 
Computer Security Rag. January 30, 2016. [Online]. Available: http://gmiru.com/
article/s7comm/ 
[18] G. Miru, “The Siemens S7 Communication—Part 2 Job Requests and Ack Data,” 
GyM’s Computer Security Rag. June 10, 2017. [Online]. Available: 
http://gmiru.com/article/s7comm-part2/ 
[19] L. Brotherson and A. Berlin, “Network Infrastructure” in Defensive Security 
Handbook. 1st ed. Sebastopol, CA, USA: O’Reilly Media, 2017. [Online]. Safari 
Books Online. 
[20] D. Mauro and K, Schmidt, Essential SNMP. 2nd ed. Sebastopol, CA, USA: 
O’Reilly Media, 2005. [Online]. Safari Books Online.  
[21] “BACnet®, the ASHRAE building automation and control networking protocol,” 
ASHRAE. Accessed November 1, 2017. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.ashrae.org/resources--publications/bookstore/bacnet 
[22]  “IPMI Basics,” Thomas-Krenn-Wiki. Accessed October 31, 2017. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.thomas-krenn.com/en/wiki/IPMI_Basics 
[23] C. Bodungen, B. Singer, A. Shbeeb, K. Wilhoit and S. Hilt. Hacking Exposed 
Industrial Control Systems: ICS and SCADA Security Secrets and Solutions. New 
York, NY, USA. 2016. [Online]. Safari Books Online.  
[24] The CIP Networks Library Volume 1: Common Industrial Protocol, 3rd ed., Open 
DeviceNet Vendor Association, Inc., Ann Arbor, MI, USA. April 2017.  
[25] CIP Networks Library Volume 2: EtherNet/IP Adaptation of CIP, 1st ed., Open 
DeviceNet Vendor Association, Inc., Ann Arbor, MI, USA. April 2017. 
 47 
[26] C. Sanders and J. Smith. “Detection Mechanisms, Indicators of Compromise, and 
Signatures” in Applied Network Security Monitoring. Waltham, MA, USA: 
Syngress, 2014. [Online]. Safari Books Online. 
[27] Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team, “ICS-CERT 
Monitor,” Washington, DC, USA, Rep. ICS-MM201306, 2013. [Online]. 
Available: https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/monitors/ICS-MM201306  
[28] O. Yuksel, J. Hartog, and S. Etalle, “Reading Between the Fields: Practical, 
Effective Intrusion Detection for Industrial Control Systems,” in Proceedings of 
the 31st Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, 2016. [Online]. doi: 
10.1145/2851613.2851799  
[29] O. Redwood, J. Lawrence, and M. Burmester, “A symbolic honeynet framework 
for SCADA system threat intelligence,” in IFIP International Federation for 
Information Processing, 2015. [Online]. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-26567-4-7 
[30] R. Piggin, and I. Buffey, “Active defence using an operational technology 




[31] A. Serbanescu, S. Obermeier, and D. Yu, “ICS Threat Analysis Using a Large-
Scale Honeynet,” in Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium for ICS & 
SCADA Cyber Security Research, 2015. [Online]. doi: 10.14236/ewic/ICS2015.3  
[32] S. Kuman, S. Groš and M. Mikuc, “An experiment in using IMUNES and Conpot 
to emulate honeypot control networks,” in 2017 40th International Convention on 
Information and Communication Technology, Electronics and Microelectronics 
(MIPRO), Opatija, 2017, pp. 1262–1268. 
[33] “About,” Wireshark. Accessed March 1, 2018. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.wireshark.org/ 
[34] “PDU type,” BACnet Wiki. Accessed March 6, 2018. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.bacnetwiki.com/wiki/index.php?title=PDU_Type 






THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 49 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
